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Abstract 
According to the widely used Managerial Power Model, a higher hierarchical position 
with associated higher power leads to higher compensation. In contrast, the 
Compensating Wage Differentials Model argues that there is a non-positive 
relationship between positional power and total compensation. Both power and 
income yield utility and in equilibrium managers are prepared to trade-off the two 
elements. The two opposing propositions are tested using a large survey data set from 
Switzerland. The results suggest that power positions do not yield higher 
compensation. Rather, there is a non-positive relationship between power position and 
compensation, if one takes into account all relevant factors influencing total 
compensation. 
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MANAGERIAL POWER AND COMPENSATION 
 
 
 
Introduction 
A positive relationship between power, and in particular managerial power, and compensation is 
generally accepted as a matter of course. That managers receive a higher compensation the more 
power they can exert, i.e. the higher their position, is common sense. It is also supported by a 
large amount of scientific literature dealing with power, which is “defined here as the capacity of 
individual actors to exert their will” (Finkelstein 1992: 506). Many other authors have used a 
similar definition (e.g. Hickson, Lee, Schneck and Pennings, 1971; Pfeffer, 1981) and have 
emphasized the importance of this concept in order to understand the behavior of firms and other 
organizations (e.g. Allison, 1971; Blau 1964; Bower and Doz, 1979; Eisenhardt and Bourgeios, 
1988; Hinings, Hickson, Pennings and Schneck, 1974; Pfeffer, 1991; Pfeffer and Allison, 1992; 
Rothschild, 1971). Much of the literature concentrates on chief executives’ power and 
compensation (e.g. Barkema and Pennings 1998; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1988, 1989, 1996; 
Hambrick and Finkelstein 1995; Wade, O'Reilly and Chandradat 1990). The more general 
“Managerial Power Model” (Lambert, Larcher et al. 1993: 442) distinguishes between four 
sources of power (organizational position, information control, personal wealth, nomination of 
"loyal" individuals to the board) but “[r]egardless of the precise source of power, the managerial-
power model predicts a positive association between the level of an executive's power and the 
level of compensation” (Lambert, Larcher et al. 1993: 442). 
The proposition of a positive relationship between managerial power and compensation has been 
subjected to a rigorous empirical test, using a sample of 303 large publicly traded U.S. firms 
(Lambert, Larcher et al. 1993). These manufacturing and service firms span a large number of 
industrial sectors in the economy (42 different two-digit standard industrial classification codes). 
The median corporate sales (in 1990 dollars) are over $ 3,000 million and the median number of 
employees is 25,000.  
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The outcome of the test is clear-cut: “Our primary results . . . show that the level of corporate and 
business-unit executive compensation is positively related to the number of employees supervised 
by the executive” (p. 452). Managers who have the potential to influence the behavior of a larger 
number of subordinates have higher actual compensation payments.  
 
An alternative view 
This paper presents an alternative view of the relationship between managerial power and 
compensation. Following the fundamental economic principle of compensating wage differentials 
(see e.g. Thaler and Rosen, 1976; Brown, 1980 or, for a literature survey, Rosen, 1986), 
employees who derive higher than average utility from part of their work (or from their income) 
have to be compensated less. Certainly “power”, in the form of being able to direct and give 
orders to subordinates, belongs to this category (a good survey on the importance of power as a 
motivator for managers is given in McClelland and Burnham, 1995). The (reasonable) 
assumption behind this reasoning is that managers enjoy both income (Y) and power (P), i.e. their 
utility function is of the form U=U (Y, P), with both first derivatives being non-negative. 
Therefore, having more power can compensate a lower income, and having less power can be 
compensated by a higher income, while utility remains constant. As a result, in equilibrium 
managers with positions of higher power receive a lower (or at least not higher) compensation. 
Measuring power by hierarchical position (i.e. by the number of subordinates), as done by 
Lambert, Larcher and Weigelt (1993), the “Compensating Wage Differentials Model” yields a 
quite different prediction than the “Managerial Power Model”:  
Proposition: 
The number of a manager's subordinates is non-positively related to his or her total 
compensation, ceteris paribus.  
The ceteris paribus condition is crucially important for our proposition. Persons in higher 
positions receive higher incomes because they have, on average, higher education, have been 
associated with the firm for a longer period of time, are predominantly male etc. Our proposition 
thus refers to the “pure” effect of power (derived from a certain position) on compensation. 
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The next section presents the data with which the proposition is tested. The empirical 
(econometric) estimates are presented in the following section. We re-estimate the Managerial 
Power Model with our data (including a large number of control variables to ensure the ceteris 
paribus condition) and use the results to test our own hypothesis. The last section draws 
conclusions. 
The Data 
The hypothesis developed is tested using data from the 1996 Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS). 
It includes roughly 16'000 respondents, who were asked detailed questions about their incomes, 
work experience, education and other variables concerning their work-life, as well as 
demographic characteristics. We restrict our attention to employees only. By doing so, we 
exclude people in education, the retired and unemployed, as well as the self-employed, whose 
income tends to understate the flow of monetary benefits from their jobs (this is mainly due to the 
Swiss tax system, which allows the self-employed to deduct many expenses). We also exclude 
those that refused to report their incomes. This, of course, might introduce a problem of 
selectivity. However, we believe that it is unlikely that the variables of interest are correlated with 
the probability of making or refusing to make an income statement. 
The SLFS focuses on total compensation. Therefore, the survey also includes questions on 
bonuses or non-monetary compensation (like company cars or company apartments). SLFS 
attributes monetary values to all these items to get a detailed picture of total compensation. To 
make wages even more comparable, we moreover correct for differences in weekly working time, 
vacation and overtime. The resulting average wage per hour is 39.65 Swiss Francs, with a 
maximum of 979.40 and a minimum of 0.10 Swiss Francs. Since an hourly wage of 0.10 Swiss 
Francs is not credible, we excluded all respondents that stated a wage per hour of less than five 
Swiss Francs. By doing so, we exclude another 54 people, so that the final sample comprises 
6966 observations1.  
Exactly 2400 people in our sample (or roughly 34 percent of the respondents) have at least one 
subordinate and are therefore considered superiors. The corrected average wage per hour of the 
                                                 
1 Excluding these people, however, leaves the average wage almost unaltered, and does not have any significant 
influences on the results. 
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superiors is 46.95 Swiss Francs. Comparing this to the average wage of the non-superiors (which 
is 36.25) reveals that superiors earn about 29 percent more on average. 
Approximately one third of the respondents (35 percent) work for companies with more that 100 
employees, only 10 percent work in very small companies (up to 30 employees), while the 
majority works for middle-sized companies with 30 to 100 employees. This corresponds roughly 
to the Swiss industry structure. This stands in sharp contrast to most studies on management 
compensation, which usually concentrate on (very) large firms and do not draw a representative 
sample as we do here. However, we believe that working with a representative sample yields a 
much more comprehensive picture than concentrating on a very special part of the industry only. 
Of course, representativeness not only refers to the firm size but also to the industries that are 
included in the sample. Companies were grouped according to the industry classification 
provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO). We include this classification in our 
estimates in order to eliminate industry specific effects. 
Estimates 
All our estimates are weighted using the cross sections weights provided by SLFS. The weights 
are necessary to correct for the representativeness, since the SLFS does not use a random, but 
rather a weighted sample. 
The results of a weighted OLS regression explaining wages in Switzerland are reported in table 1. 
We use the logarithm of wages as the dependent variable. The coefficients can therefore be 
interpreted as the percentage changes in hourly wages for an individual with the respective 
characteristics over the wage of the reference group (male Swiss with just compulsory education 
not working in one of the sectors controlled for). As Lambert, Larcher and Weigelt (1993) do, we 
include company size and dummies for each sector in the regression. Along with additional 
control variables for Saturday, Sunday and night work the latter are not shown in order to save 
space. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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The first two columns of table 1 refer to the Managerial Power Model as specified by Lambert, 
Larcher and Weigelt (1993). They exhibit the estimated coefficients in the first column and the t-
statistics in the second one. The estimation results appear to be consistent with the Managerial 
Power Model: Moving up the hierarchy and therewith having more subordinates and power is, in 
all cases, associated with a statistically significant increasing compensation (all t-values far 
exceed the level of 2). In most cases, the increases in the coefficients are statistically significant, 
the only exception being the coefficient for having between 49 and 99 inferiors (Sup99) and the 
one for having more that 100 inferiors (Sup100) which can statistically not be distinguished. The 
equation accounts for 18% of the variation in compensation, which, for a cross section with 
individual data, is quite satisfactory. 
However, the model specified by Lambert, Larcher and Weigelt lacks one very important feature: 
The effects of power on compensation are not estimated ceteris paribus, which means that they 
do not control for other (individual) characteristics which may have an impact on compensation2. 
In particular, they cannot (because of the data set they use) control for education and tenure or 
experience. It is well known that all of these variables are strongly correlated with the 
hierarchical position (and with the number of subordinates), and therefore most likely have an 
important impact on individual compensation. Columns (3) and (4) of table 1 exhibit the 
estimated coefficients and t-statistics of our Compensating Wage Differentials Model, which 
includes the control variables just mentioned. As suggested, this improved model reveals quite a 
different relationship between power (position) and compensation. In line with the ceteris paribus 
condition, we control for tenure, experience and education as well as gender and nationality.  
The effects of hierarchical position on compensation are again statistically highly significant and 
consistent with our hypothesis: Moving up the hierarchy (i.e. having more superiors) does not 
lead to higher compensation. Managers with five subordinates receive a 13% higher wage than 
workers without subordinates, but essentially the same increase (a 14% increase) holds for 
managers with 10 subordinates, with 49 subordinates or with 100 and more subordinates. Indeed, 
managers having between 20 and 49 subordinates have a lower increase (only seven percent) 
compared to non-managers than those having between 10 and 20 inferiors (who earn on average 
14 percent more). This is a statistically significant difference compared to other hierarchical 
positions. Overall, our estimates, which control for important factors besides power, suggest that 
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power is not associated with higher income. According to our interpretation of this result, there 
are two countervailing influences acting on manager compensation: On the one hand, having 
inferiors increases responsibility, which should be compensated by higher wages. On the other 
hand, superiors at the same time enjoy comparatively more power. Hence, they are prepared to 
work for a lower wage. This compensates for the effect of responsibility, so that the extra wage 
received stays roughly the same, independent of whether one is a superior of one or 99 
employees. If anything, “pure” power in the form specified by us is consistent with the 
Compensating Wage Differentials Model. 
Tenure and experience (measured by the number of years in the current firm, and in the overall 
labor market, respectively) enter the equation in linear as well as in squared terms (in order to 
allow for a non-linear relation between the two time period variables). All four control variables 
are statistically significant on the 99% level. The coefficient values indicate that both tenure and 
experience have a positive influence on total compensation. The negative coefficients for the 
squared terms indicate that there is a maximum beyond which additional years of experience or 
tenure have negative effects on compensation. However, this maximum is most likely not to be 
reached by most people, as it lies at 63 years of tenure and 77 years of experience respectively. 
A total of eight variables control for various levels of education. All levels indicated here refer to 
the highest formal educational level achieved. The reference group is a male worker with just 
compulsory education. Education I to IV refer to compulsory education plus various forms of 
secondary on- or off-the-job education. They all exert a statistically highly significant positive 
effect on compensation. For example, having a university degree increases total compensation by 
51 percent on average.  
The control variable for gender suggests that being female is associated with a statistically highly 
significant 11% lower compensation. This reflects the by now well-known gender discrimination. 
Being married is associated with higher compensation, which may be attributed to a selection 
effect. The final two control variables suggest that being a temporary resident (in Switzerland 
permit B), or living in the country with a “Green Card” (permit C), is associated with a 
statistically significant lower income. 
                                                                                                                                                              
2 The only controls they introduce are industrial sector and firm size which both have an important impact on 
compensation. 
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The Compensating Wage Differentials Model accounts for 36% of the variance, according to the 
adjusted R-squared, which is twice as much as the Managerial Power Model and extraordinarily 
high for a cross-section analysis based on individual data. 
As the sample of Lambert, Larcher et al. (1993) consists of superiors only, colums (5) and (6) 
exhibit the corresponding estimates for our data set. Excluding non-superiors reduces the sample 
to exactly 2400 observations. As can be seen, the qualitative results of the estimations remain 
unaffected: A higher position, and thus higher power, is still not associated with higher total 
compensation. The results are therefore again consistent with the proposition derived from the 
Compensating Wage Differentials Model. 
 
Conclusions 
The Managerial Power Model suggests that higher management position and therefore more 
power, is associated with higher total compensation. This paper suggests an alternative view: A 
position with more power yields higher utility, and therefore in equilibrium managers are 
prepared to trade-off more power with lower total compensation, ceteris paribus. Using a large 
data set from Switzerland, we demonstrate that higher managerial position is not associated with 
higher total compensation. The positive correlation found in some previous studies is due to 
incomplete controlling for individual characteristics. Overall, the Compensating Wage 
Differentials Model is consistent with the data, while the Managerial Power Model is not. 
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Table 1: Estimated Compensation Equation 
Dependent variable is log(wage)  
 
Variables1 Managerial Power 
Model 
(all respondents) 
Compensating Wage 
Differentials Model 
(all respondents) 
Compensating Wage 
Differentials Model 
(superiors only) 
 Coefficient 
(1) 
t-Statistic 
(2) 
Coefficient
(3) 
t-Statistic
(4) 
Coefficient 
(5) 
t-Statistic
(6) 
Constant 3.27 247.11  2.99 139.34  3.18  76.98 
Sup52 0.29 19.80  0.13 9.80 Reference Group 
Sup10 0.38 16.80  0.14 6.48 -0.03 -1.17 
Sup20 0.42 15.71  0.07 2.88 -0.08 -3.28 
Sup49 0.46 14.06  0.14 4.67 -0.03 -0.99 
Sup99 0.59 9.36  0.18 3.28  0.05  0.92 
Sup100 0.56 7.81  0.14 2.74 -0.003 -0.06 
Tenure    0.01 9.44  0.005  2.99 
Tenure squared   -0.0001      -6.60 -0.00008 -2.40 
Experience    0.02 15.09  0.017  7.45 
Experience squared   -0.0003      -11.53 -0.0002 -5.05 
Company Size 203 0.12 5.47  0.11 5.71  0.12  3.66 
Company Size 49 0.14 8.71  0.06 4.12  0.17  7.52 
Company Size 99 0.11 5.86  0.08 4.84  0.17  6.60 
Company Size 100 0.24 17.08  0.16 13.00  0.23  10.87 
Education I4    0.15 6.77  0.05  1.18 
Education II    0.19 4.70  0.18  1.91 
Education III    0.25 10.21  0.09  2.82 
Education IV    0.12 3.19 -0.01 -0.16 
Apprenticeship    0.07 4.98 -0.02 -0.84 
Matura    0.27 12.01  0.16  3.54 
Tech    0.31 11.91  0.22  5.88 
University    0.51 25.63  0.37  11.30 
Female   -0.11 -9.30 -0.19 -8.82 
Married    0.08 7.92  0.11  5.88 
Temporary Resident   -0.17 -7.93 -0.04 -2.07 
Green Card   -0.10 -12.43 -0.04 -1.69 
Included Observations 6966  6966 2400 
Unweighted Adjusted 
R2 
0.18  0.36  0.38 
Notes: 
1. Other control variables included in all regressions: Saturday, Sunday and night work and dummy variables for 
each sector. 
2. Sup5 means that the respective respondent has up to five people working for her. Sup10 stands for a manager 
who has 5 to 10 employees working for her. Sup100 means that a person has 100 and more subordinates. 
3. Company Size 20 means that the respective respondent works for a company that has up to 20 employees. 
Company Size 49 stands for companies with 21 to 49 employees. Company Size 100 means that a firm has 100 
and more employees. 
4. Education I to IV stand for different forms of additional education following compulsory education. They all 
last one to two years. 
Data source: Swiss Labor Force Survey, 1996. 
